

faculty of *eikasia* seems to play a role in both *anamnesis* and *mneme*; (4) and most importantly, the phenomenon of "recollecting" cannot be considered without taking into account its "opposite," the phenomenon of "forgetting," while the phenomenon of "having something in one's memory" does not have "forgetfulness" as its "opposite": we either have or do not have memories, we either keep them or lose them, but we lose them without being aware of our losing them, without being aware of our forgetting. To become aware of our having forgotten something means to begin recollecting.<sup>10</sup>

The question arises: can Socrates—or Plato—be unaware of the distinction between "recollecting" and "learning"? Needless to say this distinction is not an invention of Aristotle but rather one that offers itself to any one reflecting on the phenomena of "recollection" and "learning." Does Socrates—or Plato—simply deny that there is a difference between them? Or does Socrates—or Plato—change the meaning of *anamnesis*? Or is something else involved in the identification of "recollection" and "learning" as well as in the correlated identification of "forgetfulness" and "ignorance"?

To be able to deal with all these questions we shall have to consider: (a) the meaning of *εἰκασία* in books VI and VII of the *Republic*; (b) an extension of that meaning implied in the *Republic*; (c) the relations between *εἰκασία*, *διάνοια*, and *ἀνάμνησις* in the *Phaedo*; (d) the theme of *ἀνάμνησις* and *μνήμη* in the *Phaedrus* and the *Philebus*; (e) the avoidance of the *ἀνάμνησις* thesis in other dialogues and the stress on *μνήμη* in the *Theaetetus*; (f) the significance of the mythical frame which surrounds the recollection thesis.

## 2. THE MEANING OF *εἰκασία*

The term *εἰκασία* is used, in the sixth book of the *Republic* (511 e 2), to describe one of the possible "states of the soul" (*παθήματα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ* – 511 d 7). This *πάθημα* is made to correspond to a section of an imaginary line which Socrates offers for Glaucon's consideration. Later, in the seventh book (534 a), the term is assigned directly to that section of the line itself.

10. Cf. *Hist. anim.* I, 1, 488 b 25–26: "Memory as well as receptivity to teaching is common to many beings, but nothing except man is able to recollect" (*καὶ μνήμης καὶ διδαχῆς πολλὰ κοινωνεῖ, ἀναμνησκέσθαι δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο δύναται πλὴν ἄνθρωπος*).

There are only *two* main segments of the line (509 d 6 f.): one corresponding to the domain of the intelligible (τὸ νοητὸν or τὸ νοούμενον) under the leadership of the Good, the other to the domain of the visible (τὸ ὁρατὸν or τὸ ὁρώμενον) under the leadership of the Sun. We are at home in the realm of the visible, but we do have access to the realm of the intelligible. The two segments of the line are unequal in size.<sup>11</sup> Glaucon is invited to reproduce the ratio that these two segments have to each other twice by subdividing each of them into two subsections. Thus, within the domain of the intelligible two ways of being engaged in thought are to be distinguished, while the domain of the visible is to be understood to comprise two kinds of visible objects to which two different "states of the soul" correspond.

Socrates deals first (509 e–510 a) with the latter subdivision beginning with the "last" or "lowest"<sup>12</sup> subsection. To it belong all natural "images" (εἰκόνες),<sup>13</sup> all shadows, everything that might appear on surfaces of liquids or on surfaces of compact, smooth, and shining bodies, and so on. The other subsection of the visible domain encompasses all those objects which the objects of the last subsection resemble (ἔοικεν—510 a 5). That is to say it encompasses all the "originals" the images of which constitute the objects of the last section—encompasses all the "originals" which the objects of the last section "image" or mirror. The latter objects *depend*, therefore, for their appearing as images before our eyes on all the primary visible objects around us, such as animals and plants and man-made things. This relation of dependency determines the degree of clarity (σαφήνεια) and lack of clarity (ἀσάφεια) with which we perceive the two kinds of objects within the visible domain: image and original (τὸ ὁμοιωθέν—τὸ ᾧ ὁμοιώθη) are related to each other in the same way in which what is merely conjectural or "imagined" or opined (τὸ δοξαστόν) is related to what is actually cognized (τὸ γνωστόν).<sup>14</sup> The relation of *dependency* between "image" and "original" determines the degree of genuineness, the degree of

11. The context makes the version *ἄν, ἴσα* (509 d 6) in one of the codices improbable.

12. Cf. τῷ ἀνωτάτω—τῷ τελευταίῳ (511 d 8, e 2).

13. They are called later on (532 c 1) φαντάσματα θεῖα.

14. These terms take up the distinction made in book V, 476 d 5 ff., especially 478 a 10 ff., and anticipate what is said later in book VII, 534 a 3–8, about the two main segments of the line.

There is an ironic ambiguity in the term τὸ δοξαστόν itself: it may also mean "what is held in honor" (cf. δεδοξασμένοις—511 a 8).

114 "truth" (ἀλήθεια) in each of them. The relation between their respective shares in truth is mirrored in the ratio between the sizes of the two subsections, the very same ratio that obtains between the two main segments of the line.

Now, the two subsections of the visible domain also correspond to the two ways in which the two kinds of visible objects affect us.

Our relation to all the animate and inanimate things around us is one of unfathomable familiarity. Even things and surroundings with which we happen to be, as we say, "unfamiliar," have an index of familiarity on them that does not make it too difficult for us to deal with them, to respond to them. We are indeed "at home" among all the familiar and unfamiliar things and faces of the visible world. Our basic attitude towards them is one of unquestionable trust (πίστις) which extends far beyond any distrust or suspicion we might feel on occasion. Overwhelmingly, we trust that all the familiar features of the visible world are here to stay, that things are as we see them. The usual and the unusual, the expected and the unexpected, routine and novelty, are labels put on things and events within the frame of our all-embracing, all-familiar common experience.

The second kind of visible object, the various "images" of visible objects of the first kind, are no less familiar<sup>15</sup> to us, but they affect us in a peculiar way. Although, on occasion, we might not differentiate between them and the primary visible objects, we do not, as a rule, confuse an "image" with an "original." On the contrary, we are able to see, and do see, images *as images*. It is this πάθημα of the soul, this faculty<sup>16</sup> of ours, to see an image *as an image* that Socrates calls εἰκασία.

There is the temptation to overlook the crucial importance of εἰκασία in Socrates' account because it is assigned to the lowest section of the line.<sup>17</sup> We are warned by Socrates that his account leaves quite a few things unsaid (509 c 5–11; cf. also 534 a 5–8). But this much is clear from his description of the divided line: the pattern of εἰκασία on the lowest level anticipates similar patterns on higher levels of the line. Is not, indeed, the ability to exert the faculty of εἰκασία a prerogative

15. No less δοξαστέα (cf. 534 a 1–2; 6–7).

16. The meaning of "faculty" or "power" (δύναμις) is explained in 477 c–d.

17. H. J. Paton ("Plato's Theory of ΕΙΚΑΣΙΑ," in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* [1922], pp. 69–104) sees the importance of εἰκασία but it can hardly be said that he treats the subject adequately.

of human beings? Although some animals may possess the faculty of that special kind of *εἰκασία* which is intimately connected with their ability to remember,<sup>18</sup> no animal, so far as we can observe, is capable of seeing an outward image *as* an image.

The "state of the soul" called *εἰκασία* necessarily presupposes the other one which consists in our responding to the familiar visible things around us with trust. For we see "through" an image, as it were, its trustworthy original. Seeing an image as an image is a kind of "double seeing." Our response to an image cannot help reproducing the very mode of being of what we call "image" (*εἰκών*): "image" is uniquely that which *is not* what it *is*.<sup>19</sup>

Thus, while *πίστις* can be had without *εἰκασία*, *εἰκασία* cannot come into play without *πίστις*. The prisoners in the cave, described in Book VII of the *Republic*, do not manifest any *εἰκασία* before they are able to turn their heads. *Εἰκασία* has a doubleness which *πίστις* has not. The subsection which corresponds to the *εἰκόνες* and to *εἰκασία* cannot be taken by itself: it is characterized by its *dependency* on, and its *relation* to, the subsection which corresponds to the primary visible objects and to our trust in them.

### 3. THE DIANOETIC EXTENSION OF *εἰκασία*

The two subsections of the domain of the intelligible correspond to two possible ways of our being engaged in thought. To one of them, the lower one, Socrates assigns the name of *διάνοια*, "thinking," to the other, the name of *νόησις*, "intellec-tion" (511 d 8 f.), which later, in Book VII (533 e 8), is changed to *ἐπιστήμη*, "knowledge,"<sup>20</sup> while *νόησις* is then (534 a 2) referred to the entire segment of the intelligible. Again, Socrates takes up the lower section first. Before considering what he says let us turn to a later passage (523 a – 525 a) in which the "natural" functioning of our thinking, the primary and "simple" business of our *διάνοια*, is carefully described. This business consists in comparing, that is, in separating *and* relating.

a) The texture of our common experience in which we implicitly trust is woven out of a variety of perceptions. If we

18. See p. 110 and p. 112, note 10.

19. Cf. *Soph.* 240 b 12 – c 2 (also *Rep.* V, 477 a–b, 478 e and context).

20. More precisely: *ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιστήμη* (511 c 5); cf. *ἡ διαλεκτικὴ ἐπιστήμη* (*Soph.* 253 d 2 ff.).

116 try to look at them in their nascent state, as it were, we can follow Socrates' exposition.

There are perceptions of visible things, says Socrates, which give us enough clarity about the things perceived (the perception of single fingers, for example) so that most of us do not feel compelled to raise any question about them (in particular, not to raise the question, "*what is finger?*"); there are other perceptions which must seem at first perplexing and confusing (a finger appears both big and small, thick and thin, hard and soft) because "opposite" qualities (τάναντία) have been somehow "mixed up" (συγκεχυμένα) in them—as our reflecting about this "mix-up" *at once*, and with little effort on our part, informs us. Indeed, the very fact that we feel perplexed about such perceptions manifests the presence of διάνοια "in" them. For to apprehend "opposition" or "contradiction" is within the province of διάνοια, not of the senses. In such perplexing cases we cannot help weighing *in our thinking* what our sensing presents to us so as to be able to gain more clarity about it: we summon our slumbering thinking to come to the rescue and to survey what we perceive. This surveying removes the confusion, the contradiction or obstacle (ἐναντίωμα) arising in our perceptions, by *distinguishing the relations* in which a finger stands with regard (πρός) to its neighbor. A finger may be big in relation to its left neighbor and small in relation to its right neighbor. Or, as we read in the *Phaedo* (102 b–c), Simmias is tall not by virtue of being Simmias but by virtue of being *taller than* Socrates; and again Simmias is short not in virtue of being Simmias but in virtue of being *shorter than* Phaedo. Simmias is tall and short in different respects.<sup>21</sup>

In distinguishing those respects, our thinking, our διάνοια, both discriminates between and relates the things under consideration. In the case of a finger, the διάνοια has, first of all, to explore whether its being both big and small means that we are facing something which is "one" or whether it means that we are, for example, facing something which is "two." The conclusion is inescapable that "big" and "small" are, each of them, *one*, but are together *two* (ἐν ἑκάτερον, ἀμφότερα δὲ δύο<sup>22</sup>). Our sense of sight, by itself, without the help of our διάνοια,

21. Cf. *Theaet.* 154 c 1–155 c 5; 186 b 2–10; *Statesman* 283 d 11–e 2.

22. 524 b 10. Cf. *Theaet.* 185 b 2; *Hipp. Maj.* 301 d 5–302 b 3. (Cf. also *Theaet.* 203 d 4–10; *Rep.* 475 e 9–476 a 8; 479 a 5–b 8; 602 d 6–603 a 9; *Phaedo* 97 a 2–5; *Parmen.* 143 c 1–d 5; *Soph.* 243 d 8–e 2; 250 a–d.)

seems unable to make this distinction. Our thinking activity, which Socrates at this point (524 c 7) calls by its generic name – νόησις, fulfills the task. It can do this because its basic function consists indeed in discriminating *and* relating, that is to say, in *counting or numbering*. For in the act of counting we both separate and combine the things we count. It can be rightly said, therefore, that the act of counting (λογισμός) underlies *any* act of our διάνοια. Moreover, whenever we are engaged in counting, we substitute—as a matter of course, even if we are not aware of what we are doing—for the varied and always “unequal” visible things to be counted “pure” invisible units (μονάδες) which in no way differ from each other and which constitute the only *proper* medium of counting.<sup>23</sup>

Continued reflection on that act of counting leads to the establishment of τέχναι which supply us with a *precise* knowledge of all things numerable insofar as they are numerable and of their properties as well as their mutual relations which are rooted in their numerability. These τέχναι are Arithmetic and Logistic. They give us the knowledge of numbers and of the relations between them, whatever the things numbered might be.<sup>24</sup>

Having been engaged in removing the confusion and contradiction inherent in some of our perceptions by separating and relating the things perceived and having thus distinguished the different, and “opposite,” relations in which one and the same thing may stand to other things, especially with regard to their size, our διάνοια proceeds still further in dealing with those relations themselves, the “bigger than . . .” and the “smaller than . . .,” the “taller than . . .” and the “shorter than. . . .” It faces the problem of measuring. And it solves this problem by discovering a medium in which those relations acquire a *precise* meaning. That medium belongs to another τέχνη, that of Geometry. It is here, then, among geometrical entities, that strict equality, for example, can be found when certain conditions are fulfilled.

b) We now turn back to what Socrates has to say about the lower subsection of the domain of the intelligible (510 b – 511 b).

“Technicians” who deal with numbers and geometrical entities, while looking at visible things, be they natural things or man-made models or diagrams, use these visible things as if they were “images” (ὡς εἰκόσι – 510 b 4; e 3; 511 a 6), that

23. Cf. *Phileb.* 56 d – e.

24. Cf. Jacob Klein, *op. cit.*, Part I, Sections 3-7.

is, they transform them *in thought* into “images” of those invisible objects, numbers and geometrical entities, which are usually called “mathematicals” (μαθήματα) because their structure can be precisely investigated, understood, learned and, therefore, also easily remembered.<sup>25</sup>

To begin thinking means—in any conceivable case and for any conceivable purpose—to begin searching for some clarity about the matter we are dealing with. Since visible things, as far as they are perceived, may lack clarity (σαφήνεια) and our response to them lacks precision (ἀκρίβεια), our thinking is bound to search for objects which would not suffer from lack of clarity and would lend themselves to being more precisely apprehended. Our thinking discovers, in its acts of thinking, such objects to be *its very own*. They are “objects of thought,” “intelligible objects,” νοητά. It is these intelligible objects, with their more truthful clarity, that cast light on the obscurity of visible things, an obscurity which the rays of the Sun cannot remove. They present themselves, in their clarity, as models or originals of the visible things. The process of *clarification*, achieved in discriminating between and relating visible things, is the proper, ordinary, and “natural” business of thinking. In it and through it we have constant access to the domain of the intelligible. Our daily speech bears witness to that.

Out of such ordinary, matter-of-course thinking activity grow all the disciplines, all the arts and sciences, in which the “natural” ways of our διάνοια acquire the character of artful and “methodical” procedures. This is particularly true of the τέχναι which deal with numerical and geometrical entities and relations. The methods of those basic (and kindred) disciplines can well serve as paradigms of what our διάνοια always practices, quite independently of, and prior to, its scientific, “technical” performance. That is why in the passage of the *Republic* under consideration those disciplines are singled out to describe the way in which our διάνοια operates, although the range of its activity by far transcends the limits of those disciplines.

In our thinking, then, be it “technical” or “natural,” all the things and properties of the visible world with which we deal are taken to “resemble” (ἔοικε – 510 d 7) the invisible, yet

25. We have to note that the term μάθημα is studiously avoided in this passage, while it was used previously (504 d ff.) with regard to the “Good” and is used extensively later on (521 c ff.) in the outline of the education of the guardians.

more precise, objects of thought. It is clearly Socrates' contention that our *διάνοια* makes us interpret those things and properties as *images* of invisible *νοητά*. The best evidence for this contention is precisely the paradigmatic way in which arithmeticians and geometricians use pebbles and visible diagrams or models for their demonstrations, while they do not have, and do not want us to have, those visible figures and bodies "in mind" (*διανοούμενοι*). The proper objects of their reasoning are "pure" objects of thought, the "odd" and the "even," the "square" and other "figures," the "diagonal," the "three kinds of angles," and so on, of which the visible diagrams or models are but artful "images" (510 d 5–511 a 2).

Thus it appears that in our thinking we exercise a kind of *εἰκασία* which is different from the one we exercise in the domain of visible things and *their* images. This new kind of *εἰκασία* could be rightly called *dianoetic eikasia*. Let us not overlook that later, in the seventh book (534 a 1–2), the domain of *εἰκασία* and that of *πίστις* are *together* called the domain of "opinion" (*δόξα*), which domain thus corresponds to the *entire* segment of the visible. Now, according to what has been said in the fifth book (477 a–b; 478 e), the object of "opinion" (*τὸ δοξαστόν*) lies "between" what *is* and what *is not*, partaking of both and thus exhibiting the character of what we call "image."<sup>26</sup> Our *διάνοια*, therefore, cannot help interpreting *all* that is visible as having the character of an "image." Its work indeed appears to be based on *dianoetic eikasia*.

c) This work of our *διάνοια* is intended to remedy the insufficiency of our perceptions. It is, therefore, of necessity turned towards the visible things. Its field is coextensive with the territory of the visible world.<sup>27</sup> To accomplish its task of

26. See p. 115.

27. The geometrical proof, in the Greek manner, is as follows:

	Let there be given a line subdivided into four sections.
	Let these sections be designated by the letters A, B, C, D respectively.
A	Let the division be made according to the prescription: $(A + B) : (C + D) :: A : B :: C : D$ . From $(A + B) : (C + D) :: C : D$ follows <i>alternando</i> (Euclid V, 16)
B	(1) $(A + B) : C :: (C + D) : D$ . From $A : B :: C : D$ follows <i>componendo</i> (Euclid V, 18)
C	(2) $(A + B) : B :: (C + D) : D$ . Therefore (Euclid V, 11)
D	(3) $(A + B) : C :: (A + B) : B$ and consequently (Euclid V, 9)
	(4) $C = B$ .



clarification, our *διάνοια*, according to Socrates' account, is compelled (*ἀναγκάζεται* – 510 b 5; cf. 511 a 4, c 7) to use (*χρησθαι* – 511 a 4) the intelligible objects, the “originals” of visible things, as “foundations” or “sup-positions” (*ὑποθέσεις* – 510 b 5, c 3, 6; 511 a 3), and to do that in a way not quite suited to the nature of foundations or “sup-positions”: the *διάνοια*, instead of ascending from the foundations upwards (*τῶν ὑποθέσεων ἀνωτέρω ἐκβαίνειν* – 511 a 5 f.), towards its “source” (*ἐπ’ ἀρχήν*), moves downwards, towards the final result (*ἐπὶ τελευτήν* – 510 b 6), that is to say, towards the visible things.

Not surprisingly,<sup>28</sup> Plato is playing with the meaning of the term *ὑπόθεσις*. There are accepted “technical” usages of this term, especially apparent from the treatise on *Ancient Medicine* (I, XIII, XV), attributed to Hippocrates, from “analytical” mathematical procedures, alluded to later in the *Meno*,<sup>29</sup> from the discussion in the *Parmenides* and also from its frequent, and varied, occurrence in Aristotle.<sup>30</sup> Whatever the range of the “technical” meanings of *ὑπόθεσις*, they all imply something *without* which something else cannot be or cannot be conceived. As against that which depends, for its being or its being conceived, on a foundation or “supposition” (not necessarily a merely conjectural one), the foundation takes *precedence*. The nature of this precedence is in question.

In the passage under consideration Socrates puts an ambiguous emphasis on the preposition (and prefix) *ὑπό* vying with the preposition (and prefix) *ἀπό*. The foundation *underlies* that of which it is the foundation. Our *διάνοια*, in discriminating between and relating visible things, is indeed perpetually engaged in the business of providing “sup-positions” or foundations (*ὑποτίθεσθαι*) for what has to be clarified, is perpetually engaged in the business of *understanding*. The *dianoetic eikasia* it exercises consists in understanding visible things in terms of their intelligible foundations. It is thus that our *διάνοια* makes the visible things *depend* on intelligible “originals.” But to make this dependency manifest, the various *τέχναι* must show that the wanted clarity about visible things can be *deduced from* the suppositions (*ἐξ ὑποθέσεων* – 510 b 5). That is to say, the *τέχναι* are out to prove or to “demonstrate” (*ἀποδεικνύναι*) that the properties of the visi-

28. Cf. pp. 49 f.

29. Cf. pp. 83 and 207.

30. Cf. the account of *ὑπόθεσις* and *ὑποτίθεσθαι* (mostly in their colloquial use) given by R. Robinson, *Plato's Earlier Dialectic*, 1941, pp. 97–117.

ble world do indeed *follow* from something intelligible belonging to a "higher" level.<sup>31</sup> This has always been the endeavor of whatever arts and sciences of the visible world have come into existence. The strict deductive procedures in ancient mathematics are a purified, and immensely fascinating, version of that endeavor, inasmuch as here the final result (τελευτή) reached in the conclusion of an ἀπόδειξις belongs itself to the domain of the intelligible.<sup>32</sup> That is why the mathematical disciplines—in their purity—are indispensable for the education of the guardians of the city. But the "downward" motion of a mathematical ἀπόδειξις still repeats the pattern of all "technical" as well as of all "natural" thinking.

The "downward" path of the various τέχναι, and especially of the mathematical ones, tends thus, of necessity, to transform (511 b 5; c 7) the "suppositions," the ὑποθέσεις, into "sources" (ἀρχαί). Yet these sources, the intelligible entities from which the διάνοια derives its "demonstrations," are themselves in want of greater clarity.

The technicians proceed in their deductions as if such clarity has been secured because of the agreement about the terms or names which denote those suppositions. In the *Sophist* (218 c 4–5), the Stranger, whose home is neither Athens nor the visible world, has this to say about "agreement": "It is always necessary, with regard to everything, to have come to an agreement about the thing itself through arguments rather than about the mere name without argument" (δεῖ δὲ ἀεὶ παντὸς περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ μᾶλλον διὰ λόγων ἢ τοῦνομα μόνον συνωμολογήσθαι χωρὶς λόγου). A technical ὁμολογία—with regard to entities "defined" in Geometry, for example—is not an agreement about "things themselves."<sup>33</sup> Socrates, in the *Republic* (533 b 6–d 7), is quite explicit on that point. The various τέχναι, following the ordinary path and the usual concern of our διάνοια, remain turned toward the mire of that "jumbled jungle" (βόρβορος βαρβαρικός τις) which the visible world around us presents;<sup>34</sup> they are, therefore, by themselves, not capable of dealing with the obscurity of their own "beginnings"; they are not sufficiently awake to give a reasonable

31. It is not unimportant to observe that the terms ἀπόδειξις and ἀποδεικνύναι are *not* used in this passage.

32. Cf. 533 b 3–7.

33. Cf. pp. 63 and 66. (Cf. also in *Rep.* V, 454 a 6–7, the opposition between "κατ' εἶδη" and "κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὄνομα" and in *Euthyd.* 278 b 5–7 the opposition between "τὰ πρᾶγματα πῇ ἔχει" and "ἡ τῶν ὀνομάτων διαφορά".)

34. Cf. *Phaedo* 69 c 5–7.

account (λόγον διδόναι) of their own sources. And thus, in Socrates' view, they do not deserve the name of "knowledges" (ἐπιστήμαι) which we so often, from sheer habit, bestow upon them.

The kind of clarity they can reach is somewhere between the manifest clarity of knowledge and the pretended clarity of a mere opinion (533 d 5-6; 511 d 4-5). This limited clarity is the result of the peculiarly limited activity of our natural and technical διάνοια, an activity which consists in making the vast and diffuse jungle of the visible world depend on a plurality of more "precise" νοητά, an activity, however, which is not able to give an intelligible account of those νοητά themselves. In this, the clarity and precision attainable by our διάνοια is comparable to the clarity and precision sometimes achieved in our *dreams*, in which perhaps a somewhat similar activity of "supposition" takes place, followed by an ultimate identification of "image" and "original."<sup>35</sup> The power to clarify fully the suppositions of our διάνοια may not be given to mortal men.<sup>36</sup> But if an attempt is to be made—and the very activity of our thinking invites us to make it—it can be made only by *reversing the direction of our search*, by turning our attention away from the visible things towards the source or sources from which our διάνοια derives its clarifying function.<sup>37</sup>

d) This attempt—amounting, in Glaucon's appraisal, to a long and difficult task (συχνὸν ἔργον—511 c 3 f.)—is made to correspond to the uppermost subsection of the divided line (511 b 3—c 2). Here our διάνοια, our faculty of thinking, tackles the intelligible without any recourse to the visible and without transforming its "suppositions" into "sources": the suppositions from which, on the lower level, the ἀποδείξεις take off on their downward motion, are here truly suppositions (τῷ ὄντι ὑποθέσεις), bases, as it were, *on* which the διάνοια steps to rebound upwards (οἷον ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὀρμαί<sup>38</sup>), so as to try

35. Cf. 476 c 5-8.

36. Cf. *Phaedo* 107 b 1: ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη ἀσθένεια, and the context (cf. pp. 146 f.).

37. It is pertinent to quote Aristotle (*Nic. Eth.* I, 4, 1095 a 30-33) in this connection: "Let us not fail to observe the difference between arguments which proceed *from* the beginnings and those which lead *towards* them. Rightly indeed did Plato, too, [presented with an argument] raise this question and inquire whether the way leads *from* the beginnings or *towards* the beginnings. . . ." (μὴ λανθάνω δ' ἡμᾶς ὅτι διαφέρουσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγοι καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς. εὖ γὰρ καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἠπόρει τοῦτο καὶ ἐξήτει, πότερον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς ἐστὶν ἡ ὁδός . . .)

38. Cf. 532 a 7: ὀρμᾶν.

to reach, step by step (ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἰοῦσα – 510 b 7) the truly “First.” The “First” is self-sufficient in itself: it does not depend on a “higher” source nor is it in need of any “support”; it is in every sense “supposition-free” (ἀρχὴ ἀνυπόθετος – 510 b 7; τὸ ἀνυπόθετον – 511 b 6); it is the all-embracing “whole” as such (ἡ τοῦ παντός ἀρχή<sup>39</sup> – 511 b 7).

The task set for the διάνοια in this section is indeed enormous, far more so than Glaucon seems to realize. It taxes to the utmost our power of discoursing, our “dialectical” power (ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμις<sup>40</sup> – 511 b 4; 532 d 8; 533 a 8), that is, the skill to consider in close argument, in question and answer,<sup>41</sup> what presents itself as having genuine being and intelligibility (511 c 5 f.; cf. 533 a 3: αὐτὸ τὸ ἀληθές), without any “illustrations” from the domain of the visible (510 b 7–9; 511 c 1). But even here, on the highest level of its activity, on its “dialectical march” (διαλεκτικὴ πορεία – 532 b 4<sup>42</sup>), the διάνοια must proceed from supposition to supposition, by distinguishing between, and relating, the intelligible objects it is dealing with, by separating them into “parts” if they are susceptible of being thus separated, and by collecting them into “wholes” if they are susceptible of being thus collected. It is in such διαιρέσεις and συναγωγαί that the dialectical art indeed consists.<sup>43</sup> And, therefore, this art demands not only motions upwards, from multiplicity toward higher and more comprehensive unity, but also motions downwards, from unity toward lower and more dispersed multiplicity, down to the “last” intelligible objects (511 b 7 – c 2).

The difference between the two subsections of the intelligible, then, does not simply lie in the directions which the διάνοια takes. The difference is rather again—and this time defying our common experience—one between “original” and “image.” The counting and numbering, to which, on the lower level, the natural activity of our διάνοια with regard to the visible aspects (τὰ ὁρώμενα εἶδη – 510 d 5) of our familiar and trusted world can be reduced, can also be understood as

39. “τοῦ παντός” seems to be both an objective genitive and a genitive of content, the latter more than the former – cf. ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα (508 e 3) – “the beginning of the whole” and “the beginning which is the whole.”

40. Cf. p. 114, note 16.

41. Cf. *Cratyl.* 390 c 10–12.

42. As so often in the *Republic*, Socrates, in talking to Glaucon, uses terms with military connotations.

43. Cf. *Phaedr.* 266 b 3 – c 1; *Soph.* 253 c 6 – e 7; *Statesman* 285 a 7 – b 6.

"imitating" the "dialectical" dividing and collecting which the *διάνοια* undertakes on the higher level. The objects, on that higher level, are collections or assemblages of intelligible units; these units, however, are not "indifferent" mathematical *μονάδες* which can be counted and indifferently "thrown together" (*συμβληταί*<sup>44</sup>), but are both invisible and *uncountable* *εἶδη* (511 c 1-2).<sup>45</sup> Those assemblages of *εἶδη* constitute the domain of the intelligible. Their noetic "shadows" are the pure numbers scrutinized and dealt with in the *τέχναι* of Arithmetic and Logistic, which *τέχναι* not only provide the foundation for all other disciplines but also reflect the activity of our natural *διάνοια* in its most basic mode.

This means that in the segment of the intelligible, too, the lower subsection is characterized by its dependency on, and its relation to, the higher one. Even the precision that may reign in the lower seems but a "shadow" of the precision to be secured in the higher.<sup>46</sup> Thus, indeed, as Socrates says (534 a 4-5), comparing the analogous subsections of the two main segments, dialectical *νόησις* (or *ἐπιστήμη*) is to *πίστις* as natural and technical *διάνοια* is to *εἰκασία*. In its surge upwards the faculty of *dianoetic eikasia*, which our natural *διάνοια* exercises with regard to the visible world, is changed into the power of dialectical insight.<sup>47</sup> This change is a radical one, involving a total turnabout, a total conversion (*περιαγωγή* - 518 c 8-9, d 4; 521 c 6; *μεταστροφή* - 518 d 5; 525 c 5; 532 b 7) of the entire soul (*σὺν ὅλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ* - 518 c 8). It marks the beginning of a new life, a life of *φιλοσοφία* (cf. 521 c 6-8; 527 b 10), tolerable only to a few (494 a 4-7). *Φιλοσοφία* is perpetually, and inevitably, in conflict with the tendency of our natural and technical *διάνοια* to be turned toward the familiar visible world and to be immersed in it. Still, let us not fail to observe that the dialectical journey *resumes* the *initial* impulse of the *διάνοια* to which we owe our admittance to the domain of the intelligible. The various *τέχναι* enhanced by their expertness tend to

44. See Aristotle, *Met.* XIII, 7, 1081 a 5-7.

45. Cf. Jacob Klein, *op. cit.*, Section 7 C.

46. Cf. *Statesman* 284 d 1-2 and the context.

47. Since (p. 119, note 27)  $C = B$ , the inequality in length of the "intelligible" and "visible" subsections depends only on the sizes of A and D.

If, then,

$$A : B :: B : D \quad \text{or} \quad A : C :: C : D,$$

$A : D$  is in the *duplicate ratio* of either  $A : B$  or  $C : D$  (Euclid V, Def. 9). This expresses in mathematical terms the relation of the power of "dialectic" to the power of *εἰκασία*.

thwart that impulse. A great effort is needed to reactivate it. And this effort could not be undertaken but for an intense *desire* to embark upon, and to stay on, the new path.

In looking at the divided line, whether it be drawn in the dust or just "imagined," Socrates and Glaucon themselves show, by their very action of conversing and reasoning about it, the twofold possibility open to our *διάνοια*.

First, there is the line that Glaucon is invited to consider (509 d 6-8) in connection with what had just been said by Socrates and understood by Glaucon. This line is drawn and divided up expertly as if skilled mathematicians had been putting down "suppositions" so as to be able to derive from them certain conclusions.<sup>48</sup> But this is not what Socrates wants Glaucon—and us—to do.

For, secondly, the intelligible geometrical features of the line serve Socrates as bases, as "suppositions" in the strict sense (*τῷ ὄντι ὑποθέσεις*), for leading Glaucon—and us—to an understanding of the difference between the intelligible and the visible and of the different levels within each of them. The use made of the geometrical model by Socrates is wholly un-geometrical.

Immediately afterwards (*μετὰ ταῦτα δὴ . . .*—514 a 1) the pseudo-geometry is dispensed with and a strange "image" (*εἰκῶν*—515 a 4; 517 a 8) of a cave is presented to Glaucon and to us in words. This "image" gives us an opportunity to exercise our fundamental power of *εἰκασία* (cf. *ἀπεικασόν*—514 a 1), so as to enable us to refer the "imagined" cave back to a "real" one. But at the same time our faculty of *dianoetic eikasia* makes us understand that this "real" cave images our natural and civic life within the familiar world around us.

We note that Socrates takes us, in the story of the cave as well as in that of the divided line, on a predominantly *ascending* path (*ἀνάβασις*—515 e 7; 517 b 4; *ἀνοδος*—517 b 5; *ἐπάνοδος*—521 c 7).

#### 4. Ἀνάμνησις, εἰκασία, AND διάνοια IN THE *Phaedo*

There is some justification for isolating the consideration of the divided line from that of the rest of the *Republic*. There is hardly any for treating certain parts of the *Phaedo* while ignoring the whole of the dialogue.

48. As was done, for example, p. 119, note 27, and p. 124, note 47.